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Can corporate governance ratings reduce problems of asymmetric information between 
companies and investors? To answer this question, we set out to examine the information 
basis for providing such ratings by reviewing corporate governance attributes that are 
required or recommended in laws, accounting standards and codes, respectively. After 
that, we scrutinize and organize the publicly available information on the methodologies 
actually used by rating providers. However, important details of these methodologies are 
treated as confidential property, thus we approach the evaluation of corporate governance 
ratings as a means to reduce asymmetric information in a more general manner. We 
propose that the rating process may be seen as consisting of two general activities, 
namely a data reduction phase, and a data weighting, aggregation and classification 
phase. Findings based on a Danish data set suggest that rating providers by selecting 
relevant attributes in an intelligent way can improve the screening of companies 
according to governance quality. In contrast, it seems questionable that weighting, 
aggregation and classification of corporate governance attributes considerably improve 
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1. Introduction  
 
The flow of investor relevant information from security issuing companies is vast. It is 
almost impossible for private investors to keep up to date with information flows from 
these companies. Even for institutional investors, it is demanding to collect and analyze 
this information. The discrepancy between the size and complexity of the information 
flow and the investors’ capability to handle this flow explains the huge market for 
investor services; see for example Healy and Palepu (2001) on the role of information 
intermediaries.  
 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch Ratings, Dow Jones, FTSE, Institutional Shareholder 
Services and other investor services collect and analyze information from security issuing 
companies and summarize their results in ratings.  Some of these services have published 
credit ratings for many years. Bond investors use these ratings globally. In recent years, 
the spectrum of ratings has been broadened to include transparency and disclosure and 
most recently corporate governance ratings. A number of recent corporate scandals have 
demonstrated that financial performance depends on the appropriateness of the corporate 
governance arrangement (Grandmont, Grant and Silva (2004)). 
 
It is, however, time-consuming to procure company and industry data, accounting 
information, and provisions in company charters etc. with implications for corporate 
governance and to analyze and combine this information so that it can form the basis for 
an evaluation of the efficiency of a company’s ownership and management structure. For   4
that reason, many investors are prepared to pay a service firm a fee for doing this work 
(Healy and Palepu (2001)). The fee can either be paid directly to the service firm (e.g. 
pay-per-view or subscription) or be internalized as a cost of capital, hence providing a 
seemingly free service to the investors (Mishkin (1999)). 
 
The rating-providers try to strike a delicate balance between openness concerning the 
criteria and weighting structure they apply in the construction of ratings on the one hand 
and confidentiality on the other. We will refer to this as the trade-off between criteria-
transparency and method-confidentiality. Investors should know so much about the 
criteria that they are convinced of the relevance to their decision making of the corporate 
governance ratings they are about to buy. However, the methodologies used in collecting 
and analyzing information represent the main part of the intellectual capital of the rating 
provider and should not be given away to potential competitors.  
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the usefulness of corporate governance ratings (CG-
ratings) to investors. Our point of departure is that perfect information concerning the 
content of corporate governance arrangements and their implications for company 
performance does not exist in practice. In other words, we assume that asymmetric 
information cannot be removed completely by tightening disclosure requirements 
concerning governance structures. Accordingly, it seems justified to question the 
information value of the services provided to investors by rating firms. The 
appropriateness of disclosed information concerning corporate governance quality should 
therefore be evaluated by asking: can corporate governance ratings reduce problems of   5
asymmetric information between companies and investors? To answer this question, we 
set out to examine the information basis for providing such ratings by reviewing 
corporate governance attributes that are required or recommended in laws, accounting 
standards and codes, respectively. After that, we scrutinize and organize the publicly 
available information on the methodologies actually used by rating providers. However, 
important details of these methodologies are treated as confidential property, thus we 
approach the evaluation of corporate governance ratings as a means to reduce asymmetric 
information in a more general manner. We propose that the rating process may be seen as 
consisting of two general activities, namely a data reduction phase, and a data weighting, 
aggregation and classification phase. 
 
Throughout the paper, the relevance of information is evaluated from the point of view of 
an investor who is not an insider in the company and who wants to form an opinion on 
the quality of the corporate governance arrangement of the company. In the finance 
literature, such relationships are often discussed in terms of shared sets of information 
and the impact of analyst activity on information asymmetry (Frankel and Li (2004)). In 
the present context, it seems appropriate to distinguish between the following information 
sets: 
 
A.  All existing relevant CG-information 
B.  All publicly disclosed relevant CG-information 
C.  All publicly disclosed relevant CG-information exploited by the investor 
D.  All relevant CG-information on which a CG-rating is based   6
E.  All relevant CG-information, which is left in the CG-rating after the information 
transformation 
 
Part of information set A is only available to company insiders and unobtainable to the 
investor, see Figure 1. Besides, it is almost impossible for investors to procure and 
analyze all publicly disclosed relevant CG-information (information set B). The amount 
of information actually collected and used by the investor (information set C) is therefore 
only a subset of information set B. Rating agencies must make a finite list of corporate 
governance attributes on which to base the rating. In most cases, information set D is a 
subset of information set B. In the process of transforming some CG-relevant attributes 
into scores or ratings, information is lost. Information set E is therefore smaller than 
information set D, but it happens that the rating-provider interacts with the rated 
companies and therefore sometimes have access to pieces of inside information. In terms 
of the information sets defined here, the focus of this paper is on the implications for the 
investor of moving from information set C to information set E. Since the investor’s 
investment-research capacity is always limited, the manageability of using E may offset 
the potential loss of information implied by a move from C to E. The decision box in 
Figure 1 shows how the investor is supposed to choose between publicly CG-relevant 
information and a CG-rating as foundation for investment decisions. 
  
<Insert Figure 1 Information sets about here> 
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Rating-providers should improve the ability of investors to discriminate between 
companies according to their governance quality. Consequently, we propose to divide the 
methodical activity of rating-providers into two phases: 
 
1.  The CG-data reduction phase 
2.  The CG-data weighting, aggregation and classification phase 
 
First, CG-attributes are selected and data on these attributes is collected. Phase 1 
produces information set D. Phase 1 rejects attributes that are considered by the rating-
provider to be unimportant or too closely correlated with other attributes to be included in 
the further rating-calculation procedure. Second, the CG-attributes from phase 1 are 
weighted, aggregated, and classified. Phase 2 produces information set E.  The distinction 
between these two phases allows us to formulate two propositions: 
 
Proposition 1:  Phase 1 activity – CG-data reduction – does not result in a loss of 
information that reduces the ability of the rating providers to discriminate between 
companies with strong governance and companies with weak governance.  
 
Proposition 2: Phase 2 activity – CG-data weighting, aggregation and classification – 
improves the ability of the rating providers to discriminate between companies according 
to corporate governance quality.  
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the information basis 
for CG-ratings by reviewing corporate governance attributes that are required or 
recommended in laws, accounting standards and the OECD principles of corporate 
governance (i.e. requirements or recommendations concerning information sets A and B). 
After that, we scrutinize and organize the publicly available information on the 
methodologies actually used by leading rating-providers (i.e. methodologies concerning 
information set E). However, important details of these methodologies are treated as 
confidential property, thus we approach the evaluation of corporate governance ratings as 
a means to reduce asymmetric information in a more general manner. In section 3, we 
examine the two phases of the rating process and the usefulness of ratings as a substitute 
for the full information set in more detail (i.e., the substitutability between information 
sets C and E). Proposition 1 and 2 are tested by means of principal component analysis 
and simulation techniques on a Danish data set. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Rules, methodology, and measurement problems  
 
Politicians as well as business managers and investors have recognized the economic 
importance of corporate governance for many years. The interest from parliaments, 
governments and the business community is reflected in laws and regulations (hard law) 
and codes (soft law), which provide a framework of rules concerning governance to 
market participants.
1 Rating agencies have established investor services because they find 
it profitable to develop methodologies that (ideally) bridge the information gap between 
companies and investment managers. Finally, academics interested in corporate   9
governance and the functioning of financial markets want to clarify problems related to 
measurement of corporate governance quality and the potential of ratings for reducing 
asymmetric information.      
 
2.1.  CG-attributes  according to principles, codes and regulation  
  
OECD ministers endorsed the OECD principles of corporate governance in 1999. In the 
following years, the principles became an international benchmark for parliaments, 
supervisory authorities, stock exchanges, investors, companies and other stakeholders 
worldwide. In 2004, OECD published a revised version of the principles based upon a 
wide range of experiences from countries around the world. The 2004 version is 
organized into six sections with the following headlines: I) Ensuring the Basis for an 
Effective Corporate Governance Framework, II) the Rights of Shareholders and Key 
Ownership Functions, III) the Equitable Treatment of Shareholders, IV) the Role of 
Stakeholders in Corporate Governance, V) Disclosure and Transparency, and VI) the 
Responsibilities of the Board. The principles are non-binding and seek to identify 
objectives and suggest various means for achieving them. All sections list company 
attributes that might potentially affect the efficiency of the corporate governance 
arrangement. They may therefore serve as a checklist of company characteristics for 
inclusion in a corporate governance score. Several rating firms state in their marketing 
material that their ratings are constructed with a view to the attributes mentioned in the 
OECD principles. In the present context, where we focus on the potential reduction in   10
asymmetric information, it is the suggested provisions concerning disclosure and 
transparency in section V that are most relevant.  
 
The aim of the framework is to ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all 
material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, 
ownership and governance of the company. According to section V of the principles, a 
strong disclosure regime that promotes real transparency is a pivotal feature of market-
based monitoring of companies and is central to shareholders’ ability to exercise their 
ownership rights on an informed basis. It is stressed that investors should have access to 
regular, reliable and comparable information in sufficient detail for them to assess the 
stewardship of management.  
 
Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on the financial and 
operating results of the company, company objectives, major share-ownership and voting 
rights, remuneration policy for board and management, related party transactions, 
foreseeable risk factors, issues regarding employees and other stakeholders, and 
governance structure and policies. Information should be in accordance with high quality 
standards of accounting, financial, and non-financial disclosure. There should be equal, 
timely and cost-efficient access to relevant information by users.  
 
Rating-agencies are explicitly mentioned in section V, F of the principles. The corporate 
governance framework should be complemented by an effective approach that addresses 
and promotes provision of analyses and advice by analysts, brokers, rating-agencies and   11
others. The information should be relevant to decisions by investors and free from 
material conflicts of interest that might compromise the integrity of their analyses or 
advice. According to the OECD, rating agencies and other independent suppliers of 
analyses can play an important role in providing incentives for company boards to follow 
good corporate governance practices. Integrity and independence of suppliers of ratings 
and stock market research analysts are highly relevant dimensions in the disclosure and 
transparency process.  
 
In December 2004, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
published a Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies that describes 
provisions that rating agencies should incorporate into their own codes of conduct to deal 
with conflicts of interest, to improve the transparency of the rating process, and to protect 
their integrity and independence. The formulations in the IOSCO and OECD documents 
are not identical, but both organizations stress the importance of integrity and 
independence and underline the role that rating-agencies can play in helping investors to 
deal with and to compare company disclosure including information on corporate 
governance arrangements.   
 
Disclosure requirements in accounting laws aim at improving the ability of investors to 
evaluate the performance of companies. In principle, the aim is to reduce the degree of 
asymmetry of information between company insiders and outsiders. The aims of 
accounting laws and corporate governance ratings are therefore very similar. In recent 
years, corporate reporting regulation has primarily been driven by international   12
considerations. A strong move toward international trade and international movement of 
capital increases the demand for common requirements on corporate reporting. In open 
markets, the need for comparability among companies becomes obvious at several levels 
(EU Commission (2003)). Important elements include the harmonization of accounting 
practices as well as the wish to gain insight into the strength of internal controls and the 
effectiveness of other supervisory mechanisms (Hermanson (2000)). Examples of such 
supervisory mechanisms are the role of the supervisory board and the roles of internal 
and external auditors. In countries with a one-stringed governance structure (such as the 
UK), a central part of the corporate governance debate has focused on problems relating 
to independence issues (e.g. the review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors presented in Higgs (2003)). 
 
The recommendations in corporate governance codes are supplemental to the information 
items identified in the regulation of financial reporting. As such, many companies have 
adopted their reporting on CG issues as an integrated part of the annual report (see for 
example the Shell annual report (2004: 115-120)). In annual reports without a section 
formally identifying the company’s standing on corporate governance issues, some subset 
of the required information items might still be available. However, the ease of access to 
corporate information is also at stake, thus the evaluation of the corporate governance 
system of a particular company also has to reflect the level of openness and transparency. 
Hence, the level of disclosure on corporate governance issues is an intricate part of the 
qualification as good corporate governance; see the Discussion Paper on the Financial   13
Reporting and Auditing Aspects of Corporate Governance of the Féderation des Experts 
Comptables Européens (FEE) (2003: 13).  
 
The availability and credibility of information items required by accounting rules are 
summarized in the mandatory declarations in the annual report. First, the governance 
body (and executive management) in the company is obliged to issue an opinion on the 
fairness of the financial statements. Second, the external auditor issues an opinion on the 
fairness of the correspondence of the information examined through the audit with the 
criteria of the accounting framework as well as compliance with other legal requirements 
and terms determined in company bylaws (FEE (2003: 68)). Through the availability of 
these declarations, a large number of relevant information items are reduced to relatively 
few (but potentially crucial).  
 
The logic is that the quality of financial information in the annual report is assessed by 
identifying the use of a prescribed accounting framework and the compliance of the 
information with the framework. From a comparability viewpoint, the framework used in 
the international accounting standards may be preferable, but from a relevance viewpoint 
this may not be of higher quality than the national frameworks that are able to cater for 
special institutional issues. In addition, the quality of financial information is assessed 
indirectly by identifying governance structures supporting reporting of higher quality, 
e.g., the competence of management, the availability of internal controls, internal audit 
structures, independent audit committees, the choice of qualified auditors etc. 
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2.2. Rating methodologies in practice    
 
In this section, we try to provide an overview of the actual composition of information set 
D in figure 1. The number of rating agencies providing metrics that rate corporate 
governance structures and practices and sell their services to investment managers is 
increasing. At the same time, the acquisition by ISS of Deminor in May 2005 illustrates 
that structural changes in the industry are under way.  Below, we compare the rating 
methods applied by market leaders. Table 1 presents a comparison of characteristics.  
 
<insert Table 1 Comparison of rating agency methodologies and data sets about here> 
 
Standard and Poor’s  
 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) provides Corporate governance rankings using two different 
approaches.
2 S&P applies 98 disclosure items in their Transparency and Disclosure 
(T&D) studies, while their CG Scores (CGS) are based on 80-100 factors (Standard & 
Poor’s (2004)). S&P explains that the methodology used in the T&D studies, which is a 
ranking based on simple summation of binary attributes, is by no means comparable to 
the CGS rankings. They argue that “interactive corporate governance scoring service is 
a much more detailed in-depth analysis of the corporate governance practices of 
companies” (Standard and Poor’s (2002: 4)). In the T&D studies, the analysts of 
Standard and Poor’s thoroughly scrutinize annual reports and use a checklist of 98 
possible information items and attributes. These are grouped into three categories: 1)   15
ownership structure and investor relations, 2) financial transparency and information 
disclosure, and 3) board and management structure and process.  
 
Their flagship product is the Standard and Poor’s Corporate Governance Score. It is the 
result of a calculation based on detailed analyses of annual reports and other company 
documents including interviews with key company persons. S&P discloses a score for the 
following four components in addition to the overall CGS: 1) ownership structure and 
external influences, 2) shareholder rights and stakeholder relations, 3) transparency, 
disclosure and audit, and 4) board structure and effectiveness. A score is constructed 
either on a confidential basis for intended use only by the company or for use externally, 
allowing the company to show their governance standards to a wider audience.   
 
Institutional Shareholder Services 
 
For several years, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) has provided research and 
advisory services to institutional investors.
3 The agency has developed a tool for 
monitoring and comparing corporate governance structures. The core topics included in 
the ISS CGQ
TM ratings are: 1) board structure and composition, 2) audit issues, 3) charter 
and bylaw provisions, 4) laws of the state of incorporation, 5) executive and director 
compensation, 6) qualitative factors, 7) director and officer stock ownership, and 8) 
director education.  
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The score for each core topic reflects a set of key governance variables. There are 
presently 61 sub-issues. The CGQ ratings are computed relative to peer companies (using 
index and industry as benchmarks). ISS gathers data from various publicly available 
documents. In addition, the companies are invited to provide ISS with corrections and 
updates that may give ISS occasion to recalculate the rating. ISS has established a CGQ 
subscription service that allows the companies to get the ISS data before the ratings are 
published. Under the subscription conditions, the companies also have the opportunity to 
compare their own rating with the rating of peer companies. ISS currently provides 
profiles and relative ratings for more than 7,500 companies worldwide. ISS delivers 
proxy analyses of listed companies to their institutional customers. In these analyses, 
details on the key factors driving the ratings are published. The main idea is to make it 
easier for institutional investors to take the corporate governance structures of the 
companies into consideration when making investment decisions.  
 
In September 2005, ISS has released an updated version (version 3.0) of its CGQ rating 
methodology. Based on statistical tests on ISS governance data from 2002 through 2004 
against 16 performance measures, the weights applied in the construction of CG ratings 
have been modified. CG attributes with a high correlation with specific performance 
measures have been given a relatively higher weight.  Several CG attributes have been 
added, modified or removed because their relevance has changed in the US after the 
enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. After the 2005 revision, ISS applies 63 attributes.  
   17
Very recently, ISS has launched a combined rating and indexing initiative together with 
FTSE. The idea behind the FTSE ISS Corporate Governance Indexes is that by 
combining their respective expertise on corporate governance and indexing, it is possible 
to offer investors and asset managers a service that can support their everyday assessment 
of listed companies and their corporate governance practices. At the beginning of 2005, 
the governance practices of almost 2,200 companies were followed by ISS. Subscribing 
investors can use these analyses to manage the level of corporate governance risk by 
adjusting the structure of portfolios. 
 
The ISS Corporate Governance Quotient System has been modified slightly with a view 
to its application in the FTSE ISS Corporate Governance Indexes. As opposed to the 
eight categories of attributes above, there are only five. They apply data on 1) 
compensation systems, 2) stock ownership, 3) equity structure, 4) board structure, and 5) 
independence and integrity of the audit process in order to rank the companies and create 
the indexes. Responses are normalized to give a single score for each category between 
one and five. A “five” indicates that a company is in the top quintile, while a “one” 
indicates that it is in the bottom quintile. In the last step in the procedure, where the 
scores from each of the five categories are combined, a further normalization gives a 
single score between one and five for each company.    18
GovernanceMetrics International  
 
GovernanceMetrics International (GMI) provides Accountability Ratings to customers, 
which include institutional investors, law and accounting firms, insurance underwriters 
and regulators.
4 GMI rates companies based on their inclusion in a well-known market 
index. Companies whose shares are included in stock indices published by Morgan 
Stanley Capital International and Standard and Poor’s are normally followed by GMI.  
The rating reports include a summary of the company’s overall governance profile and 
detailed information on each of the six categories applied by GMI:  1) board 
accountability, 2) financial disclosure and internal controls, 3) shareholder rights, 4) 
executive compensation, 5) market for control and ownership base, and 6) corporate 
behavior and corporate social responsibility issues. 
 
Companies are assigned an overall GMI rating plus separate ratings for each of the six 
categories. These categories are divided into sub-sections. Each individual metric has a 
numerical value and each category and sub-section is weighted according to investor-
interest. The rating reports provide summary statistics for the board of directors, 
including average age, tenure, and number of other public company board seats held by 
directors.  
 
Rating criteria is based on securities regulations, stock exchange listing requirements and 
corporate governance codes and principles. In order to limit the degree of subjectivity, 
GMI structure their metrics in a manner that can only produce three answers: yes, no, or   19
not disclosed. GMI collects public data from regulatory filings, company websites, news 
services and other specialized websites. Data entry reports are sent by GMI to each 
company in their research universe for a final accuracy check before the ratings are 
published. Companies score on a scale from 1.0 to 10.0 and always score relative to other 
companies in the research universe. Companies are assigned 14 ratings in total. GMI 
applies asymmetric geometric scoring which magnifies the record of outliers. Every six 
months, all companies are re-rated based on updated information.   
      
Comparison of methods 
 
Rating providers seem to agree on one point: the quality of a firm’s corporate governance 
arrangement matters. The theoretical foundation concerning which company attributes 
are most important in an evaluation of the governance quality is, however, relatively 
weak. There is room for diversity in the selection of attributes and in the choice of 
calculation method. Although rating-providers cannot be expected to fully agree on the 
construction of CG ratings, there are many similarities (see Table 1). They are all inspired 
by disclosure requirements in accounting laws and stock exchange regulations and by 
corporate governance codes and principles. The agencies seem to share the view that 
ratings should be based on ownership structure, rights of shareholders, board structure 
and composition, disclosure and transparency. However, their approaches in data 
collection and scoring and weighting are different. In the next section, we will try to 
analyze the implications of such differences. 
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3. Exploring the rating process 
 
We have proposed that the rating process is divided into two phases. First, a finite 
number of relevant attributes has to be collected from the seemingly infinite set of 
possible corporate governance related information attributes. Second, weights are 
assigned, weighted attributes are aggregated, and companies are classified. To assess the 
robustness of this process and the measurement system behind a corporate governance 
rating, we seek to mimic this process by means of a Danish data set (the UFB data set) 
that has not (yet) been used for rating purposes, but which is fully comparable. The 
problems presented are either general in nature reflecting concerns common to the 
agencies or reflecting differences in methodology. 
 
The data set contains 120 corporate governance related attributes in 100 Danish 
companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange.
5 Data derives mainly from 
information in the 2003 annual reports, articles of association, and company websites. 
Institutional Shareholder Services and European Corporate Governance Service as well 
as the Danish corporate governance code have inspired the selection of attributes.
6 In an 
effort to reduce errors and misunderstandings, the sample companies have been asked to 
read the tables with their own data and to point out incorrect information. This validation 
procedure is comparable to the accuracy check used by GMI. In the present context, 92 of 
the 100 companies responded to this task, hence increasing the credibility of the data set.  
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The claim by the agencies is that a corporate governance rating provides the investor with 
a better basis for making investment decisions by having access to information set E 
rather than information set C. Under normal circumstances, it seems reasonable to 
assume that information set D (from which information set E derives) is larger than 
information set C. Hence corporate governance ratings have the potential to reduce the 
asymmetric information and add value to the investment decision. To the investor, the 
main issue must be how much information is excluded when moving from information 
set D to information set E. Not having access to the actual methodologies or data sets 
used by the agencies, we offer an alternative approach to demonstrate the potential 
information loss due to data reduction mechanisms and the effects of weighting, 
aggregation and classification.  
 
3.1 The CG-data reduction phase 
 
It could be argued that rating agencies provide informational value by performing a 
necessary reduction of the almost infinite number of attributes when deciding on the 
finite number of attributes to be considered. The counter-argument is that (valuable) 
information is potentially excluded by reducing the full information set to a more limited 
number of attributes. In this section, we seek to examine the validity of proposition 1, i.e. 
that rating providers can be assumed to select CG-attributes in a way that improves the 
ability to discriminate according to the quality of corporate governance. 
   22
An appropriate way to examine the scope of excluded information is to apply a principal 
component analysis to a comparable data set such as the UFB data set. Two insights can 
be drawn from such an analysis. First, it draws attention to the correlation between 
attributes. If there are high correlations, some of the attributes are likely to measure the 
same latent characteristics. Second, by implication it produces a measure of how much 
information is excluded in the data reduction process.  
 
In order to apply the principal component analysis, we assume that the 120 corporate 
governance attributes in the UFB data set represent the complete information set on 
which the finite list of attributes should be chosen, i.e. they represent information set A or 
B depending on the availability of private information. We map out 10 underlying 
components of the data, and within each component, we record the five attributes with 
the highest loadings. This results in 50 attributes. Because some attributes repeat 
themselves in different categories, the actual number of attributes in the finite list is 40. 
This procedure is a proxy for the first phase in the information transformation process. 
Ten categories are chosen based on the scree plot. Alternatively, the number of categories 
could have been chosen based on the number of eigenvalues larger than 1. This would 
give us 34 categories. However, from the scree plot, we see that beyond ten factors, the 
marginal contribution of additional components is very small. Our results show that 
approximately 50% of the initial information is excluded in the transformation from 
information set A or B to information set D, see Table 2.  
 
<Insert Table 2 Categories derived from principal component analysis about here>   23
 
By moving from 120 attributes to 40 attributes, the findings suggest that some 
information is of course excluded, but we argue that this need not reduce the ability to 
discriminate between companies with strong corporate governance and companies with 
weak corporate governance as long as the CG-data is reduced in an intelligent way. Thus, 
in the study based on the Danish data set we find some support of proposition 1.  
 
3.2 The CG-data weighting, aggregation and classification phase 
 
In this section, we examine the validity of proposition 2, i.e. that weighting, aggregation 
and classification can be assumed to improve the ability of the rating providers to 
discriminate between companies according to corporate governance quality.  
 
For the investor, a crude measure of corporate governance quality from information set C 
should not be too difficult to establish. Companies could be classified as high quality 
companies, medium quality companies, or low quality companies simply from their level 
of compliance. To reduce asymmetric information, the transformation process must 
provide additional value in terms of ability to distinguish even subtle differences between 
companies. In addition to a careful construction of the finite list of attributes, this 
reduction can be done by effective use of the extracted information.  
 
The transformation of the information in information set D involves a number of 
measurement issues that may have implications for the usefulness of ratings as a   24
substitute for the full information set. In this section, we examine some of the problems 
related to weighting, aggregation and classification. The attributes in information set D 
are mainly binary attributes that record whether a particular corporate governance related 
attribute is disclosed or not. 
 
There are two different ways to approach the attributes: assignment of weights or no 
assignment of weights. The latter approach, however, implicitly assigns the same weight 
to all attributes, thus generating an aggregation measure that is arithmetic in nature, 
whereas the former approach by assigning individual weights generates an aggregation 
measure that is geometric in nature. In the process of assigning weights to attributes, we 
expect informational value (better use of information).  
 
To examine the effect of assigning weights to attributes, we look at the variation of 
attribute values with and without weights, see Figure 2. Of course, there is no variation in 
attribute values when no weights are assigned. Using 40 attributes, the weight implicitly 
assigned to each attribute is constant at 0.025. When random weights are assigned,
7 we 
see that values are approximately normal distributed. Assigning weights explicitly 
recognizes that some attributes should have a larger impact on the aggregation measure 
than others. The new distribution of weights is expected to change the outcome of the 
subsequent score calculation. Since the random selection of weights is a “stupid” proxy 
procedure, the effect is most likely larger in practice. 
 
<Insert Figure 2 Distribution of weights about here>   25
 
The next step in the transformation of information is aggregation. Attributes are typically 
aggregated at overall level alone or first at category level and then overall level, thus 
producing the final score. Starting the aggregation at category level is either simply to 
disclose information that is more detailed or to assign weights to each category in order 
to convey features that make better use of information.  
 
To examine the effect of these different procedures, we construct 5 categories from the 
10 components extracted from the data set in the first phase of the process, and assign 
weights to each category based on their relative contribution to the variance retained in 
the principal component analysis.
8 Our aggregation measure is similar to the one used in 
the S&P T&D studies. In Figure 3, we find only small differences in terms of distribution 
of aggregates between the two aggregation procedures.  
 
<Insert Figure 3 Distribution of aggregates to be used for classification about here> 
 
The last step in the transformation of information from information set D to information 
set E is the classification of scores. There are several ways to combine the different ways 
of weighting and aggregation described above, but common to all the ranking procedures 
applied in practice is a transformation of scores into a deciles or quintiles distribution, i.e. 
they create a scale that ranks each company relatively from 1 to 10 or from 1 to 5. In 
principle, all companies could have very high disclosure standards, but due to the forced 
distribution, the worst of the best is ranked poorly.   26
 
Using the ranking procedures just described, we examine the effect of different forced 
distributions by registering in how many cases the two approaches disagree. This is done 
for three different score measures, see Table 3. Comparing a ranking based on overall 
aggregation of attributes respectively with and without weights, we find that the two 
methods disagree on the classification of 18 companies when deciles are used. In line 
with expectation, this reduces to a smaller number equal to 6 when quintiles are used. As 
a robustness check, we double the variance in the weight distribution to allow for larger 
differences. The resulting classification of companies does not change notably
9. 
Comparing a ranking based on overall aggregation of attributes respectively without 
weights and category (weighted) aggregation of attributes without weights, we find that 
the two methods disagree in the classification of 26 companies when deciles are used and 
12 companies when quintiles are used.  
 
<Insert Table 3 Disagreement in classification about here> 
 
These findings suggest that there is practically no difference between the classification of 
companies based on weighting and classification based on a simple counting of the 
presence or absence of attributes. Accordingly, the analyses based on the UFB-data set 
indicate that proposition 2 should be rejected. 
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4.  Summary and conclusion 
 
 In this paper, we have tried to answer the question: can corporate governance ratings 
(CG-ratings) reduce problems of asymmetric information between companies and 
investors? The information environment was systematized by means of five CG-relevant 
information sets. The activity of rating-providers was divided into two phases: 1) A CG-
data reduction phase, and 2) a CG-data weighting, aggregation and classification phase. 
In proposition 1, we hypothesized that phase 1-acitivity does not reduce the ability to 
discriminate between companies according to CG-quality. In proposition 2, we 
hypothesized that phase 2-acitivity improves the ability to discriminate. 
 
In section 2 of the paper, the information basis for providing CG-ratings was presented. 
Rating providers seem to agree that the quality of a firm’s CG-arrangement matters and 
that it depends on ownership structure, shareholder rights, board structure, disclosure and 
transparency. However, their approaches in data collection and scoring and weighting are 
different. CG-principles, codes and regulation provide a long list of CG-attributes, but the 
theoretical basis for choosing attributes relevant to CG-quality is in fact relatively weak. 
This implies that there is room for diversity in the selection of attributes and in the choice 
of calculation methods. 
 
In section 3, we examined the two propositions by means of the Danish UFB-data set. 
Although we have some information concerning the way in which the rating-providers 
carry out data reduction in order to arrive at information set D on which they base their   28
CG-rating, our knowledge is incomplete. Since we do not know precisely how rating-
providers undertake data reduction in practice, we have used a principal component 
analysis as a proxy process for phase 1-acitivity. For each of 10 selected components, the 
five attributes with the highest positive loadings have been included. Through the proxy 
process we obtain a reduction from 120 to 40 attributes. We find that intelligent CG-data 
reduction need not reduce the ability to discriminate between companies with strong 
corporate governance and companies with weak corporate governance. Thus, in the study 
based on the Danish data set, we find some support of proposition 1.  
 
We do not know the weights or aggregation methods applied in practice by the rating-
providers. These are subject to method confidentiality. Proposition 2 was therefore 
examined by means of a simulation procedure, which was in fact a proxy procedure for 
phase 2-activity. The resulting average weights were used to classify the sample 
companies into deciles and quintiles according to level of CG-quality. The next step was 
to compare the distribution on deciles and quintiles based on this weighting with a 
distribution in which only the presence or absence of the 40 attributes in the sample of 
companies were counted. We find that there is practically no difference between the 
classification based on weighting and the classification based on a simple counting of the 
presence or absence of attributes. Accordingly, the analysis based on the UFB-data set 
indicates that proposition 2 should be rejected. 
 
The implication of the findings is that asymmetric information can be reduced by an 
intelligent use of CG-ratings. The outcome of the investor’s decision to substitute   29
information set C – the manageable publicly disclosed CG-information – with 
information set E – a CG-rating -  relies on the appropriateness of the methodologies used 
by the rating-agencies. Due to method confidentiality, the appropriateness of the 
methodologies used is, however, difficult for the investor to evaluate.  
 
The suitability of replacing the rating providers’ actual phase 1- and phase 2-activities by 
proxy processes, and of using the Danish UFB-data set to carry out the two proxy 
processes, relies on the basic assumption that the variation patterns in the UFB-data set 
have sufficient similarities with the variation patterns in the research universe in which 
the rating-providers operate. In addition, the very idea of replacing rating procedures 
founded on the rating-providers’ considerable knowledge of and experience with regard 
to relevant measures with an impact on CG-quality with two almost mechanical proxy 
processes can of course be questioned. We look forward to critical reactions from 
analysts employed by the rating-providers who are capable of evaluating the 
appropriateness of the assumptions made here, because they are involved in actual CG-
data reduction and CG-date weighting, aggregation and classification activities.          
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1 The European Corporate Governance Institute lists CG codes from 49 countries in addition to the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, see www.ecgi.org.   
2 Information on methodology and data sets of S&P is available on www2.standardpoors.com 
3 Information on methodology and data sets of ISS is available on www.isscgq.com/abouttheratings.htm 
4 Information on methodology and data sets of GMI is available on www.gmiratings.com 
5 We thank Morten W. Langer and Ugebrev for Bestyrelser for providing us with this data. The data was 
originally collected to map out the extent to which Danish companies comply with domestic and 
international corporate governance standards.  We will refer to this data set as the UFB data set. A full list 
of attributes in the data set is available upon request to the authors. 
6 This is "The Nørby Committee’s report on Corporate Governance in Denmark – recommendations for 
good corporate governance in Denmark". Download is possible from www.corporategovernance.dk.  
7 Weights for each attribute are drawn randomly between 0 and 1 and then rescaled in order to sum to unity. 
Drawing from 0 to 1, we assume that all attributes contribute positively to the score. For each of the 100 
companies in the data set, 1000 paths of the list of finite attributes are simulated. Our results are based on 
averages of these 1000 weighted scores. 
8 These 5 categories are 1) Board and management structure (16.59 %), 2) Compensation (18.55 %), 3) 
Disclosure (27.39 %), 4) Ownership (25.72 %), and 5) Auditors and lawyers (11.75 %). Numbers in 
parenthesis are weights assigned to each category.    
9 More precisely, we set the sum of the randomly drawn weights to two instead of one. On average, this 
corresponds to doubling-up the variance. The implication for the range of weights is a shift from {0.0247-
0.0254} to {0.0493-0.0508}. The number of disagreements between the benchmark method and an overall 
aggregation is 22 companies (versus 18 companies when weights sum to one) when deciles are used and 10 
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B Table 1 Comparison of rating agency methodologies and data sets 
  S&P T&D  S&P CGS  ISS CGQ  ISS CGQ 3.0  ISS FTSE  GMI 
Basis for Ratings          
Refer to OECD Principles  Y and N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Refer to other CG codes  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Sources mentioned          
Annual  reports  Y Y Y Y  Y  Y 
Company  documents  N Y N N  N  N 
Websites  N N Y Y  Y  Y 
Press  releases  N Y Y Y  Y  Y 
Corrections possible by rated company  N 
 
Interactive 
datacollection  Y Y  Y  Y 
Data reduction          
Number of CG attributes  98 80-100  61 (US) 
55 (non-US)  63 (US)  61 (US) 
55 (non-US)  “Hundreds” 
Number of categories/subcategories  3/12  4/13  8  4/8  5  6 
Number  of  scores  4 5 2 6  6  14 
Discretionary options by data collector  N  Y  N  N  N  N 
Data weighting, aggregation and 
classification          
Discretionary options by data collector  N  Y  N  N  N  N 
Information on weighting 
Unweighted 







Weights based on 
”level of impact” 
Each individual metric has 
a numerical value and each 
sub-section and research 
category is weighted 
according to “investor 
interest”. 
Information on aggregation and 
classification 




as part of 
aggregation 
Responses are 
normalized to give a 
single score for each 
theme. The 
combination of theme 
scores is normalized 
to give a single score. 
Uses asymmetric geometric 
scoring which magnifies 
the record of outliers 
according to “investor 
interest”. 
Score range 
1-10 1-10  1-100 
1-100 and 
1-5 for each 
category 


























Overall CGI (index) 
rating 
+ 
Score for each 
theme 
Overall global rating +  
Score for each research 
category 
 
Overall home market rating 
+ 
Score for each research 
category 
Score as ranking or rating   Ranking  Ranking  Ranking  Ranking  Ranking  Rating   37
Table 2. Categories derived from principal component analysis 
 
Panel A Characterization of categories 
Component Description 
1  Board and management structure, process and compensation 
2  Disclosure and compliance with codes 
3  Information on management compensation 
4  General policy of transparency and information disclosure 
5  Management and board share-ownership 
6  Degree of concentration of ownership and voting power 
7 Institutional  share  ownership of the company 
8  Role of lawyers in the company and on the board 
9  Size and type of auditor compensation 
10  Presence and contents of a management bonus system 
Panel B Variance captured by the extracted components 
Component  % of variance  Cumulative % 
1 8.40  8.40 
2 7.47  15.88 
3 6.53  22.40 
4 6.40  28.80 
5 4.57  33.37 
6 4.26  37.63 
7 4.19  41.82 
8 3.08  44.90 
9 2.87  47.76 
10 2.86  50.62 
 
Note: Analysis based on the UFB data set. Rotation method is Varimax 
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0  0  0 
40
0 0 0  0 
0.0247  0.0248  0.0249  0.025 0.0251 0.0252 0.0253  0.0254 
Weights
Weights 
No weights  39


























0  0.1  0.2  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  1 
Aggregation measure
No categorial weights
Categorial weights   40
Table 3. Disagreement in classification  
 
Benchmark relative to 
Overall aggregation with weights  Categorical (weighted) aggregation 
Deciles   Quintiles   Deciles   Quintiles   
10  1 10  0 10  1 10  3 
9  1 8 0 9 4 8 4 
8  1 6 1 8 4 6 2 
7  1 4 3 7 2 4 2 
6  1 2 2 6 3 2 1 
5  2     5 3    
4  3     4 3    
3  4     3 3    
2  3     2 2    
1  1     1 1    
Σ  18   6    26   12 
 
Note: The benchmark is distribution based on overall aggregation of attributes without 
weights 
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